Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is a promising approach to remove all side channels from the measurement unit, which is regarded as the "Achilles' heel" of QKD. An essential assumption in MDI-QKD is however that the sources are trusted. Here we experimentally demonstrate that a practical source based on a semiconductor laser diode is vulnerable to a laser seeding attack, in which light injected from the communication line into the laser results in an increase of the intensities of the prepared states. The unnoticed increase of intensity may compromise the security of QKD, as we show theoretically for the prepare-and-measure decoystate BB84 and MDI-QKD protocols. Our theoretical security analysis is general and can be applied to any vulnerability that increases the intensity of the emitted pulses.
I. INTRODUCTION
The distribution of a secret key between two authorized parties, Alice and Bob, is a fundamental but challenging cryptographic task. Such secret key is the essential resource of the one-time-pad algorithm [1] , the only known encryption method that can offer unconditionally secure communications. Public-key cryptography solves this problem by resorting to computational assumptions, for instance, the difficulty of factoring large numbers [2] . This approach is however vulnerable to technological advances in both hardware and software; indeed, it is wellknown that factoring is an easy problem on a quantum computer [3] . Quantum key distribution (QKD), on the other hand, provides a solution based on the laws of quantum physics, and thus, in theory, it can guarantee that the distributed keys are information-theoretically secure [4] [5] [6] .
There is however a big gap between the theory and the practice of QKD because the behaviour of real QKD devices typically deviates from that considered in the security proofs. Such deviation could be exploited by an eavesdropper, Eve, to obtain information about the secret key without being detected. As a result, it turns out that the security of QKD implementations is seriously threatened by quantum hacking [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . Most of the quantum hacking attacks realized so far exploit imperfections of the single-photon detectors (SPDs), which are regarded as the Achilles' heel of QKD [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . Indeed, in recent years there has been an enormous theo- * angelhuang.hn@gmail.com retical and experimental effort to try to close the detectors' security loopholes and restore the security of QKD realizations. Some solutions are based on hardware and software patches [22, 23] ; their main drawback is however that each patch typically protects only against a specific loophole, i.e., the system might still be vulnerable to unknown attacks. Moreover, patches might also be hacked [18, 19] . A safer and more elegant solution is that of measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [24, 25] . Remarkably, this latter approach guarantees security independently of the behaviour of the measurement device, which can be treated as a "black box" fully controlled by Eve. This is achieved by turning Bob's receiver into a transmitter by means of a time-reversed Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) protocol [26, 27] . Indeed, MDI-QKD has been successfully demonstrated in several recent experiments [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] including an implementation over 404 km [34] .
With the advent of MDI-QKD all security loopholes from the measurement unit are closed, so the focus is now on how to protect the QKD transmitters. For instance, decoy-state QKD [35] [36] [37] is a practical solution to defeat the photon-number-splitting attack [38, 39] . This attack exploits the multi-photon pulses emitted by practical light sources to learn the part of the key generated with these pulses. More recently, several works have considered other imperfections of the transmitter, and new security proofs that guarantee security in the presence of such imperfections have been developed. For example, Refs. 40-42 evaluate the security of QKD in the presence of modulation errors, and Refs. 43 and 44 consider the case where the emitted pulses have undesired correlations between them. Also, Refs. 42, 45-47 study the scenario where the transmitter is not perfectly shielded from Eve, but it can leak part of its internal information to her. This might happen for instance either passively (e.g., through say the device's electricity consumption and/or heat generation) or actively due to for example a Trojanhorse attack (THA). In this latter type of attack Eve injects bright light into the transmitter and then analyses the back-reflected light to obtain information about the quantum signals emitted. Basically, Refs. 45-47 quantify the optical isolation that is needed in order to achieve a certain performance (i.e., a certain secret key rate over a given distance) in the presence of a THA. Finally, a type of light injection attack that affects the operation of the laser diode in the transmitter has recently been introduced, allowing Eve to de-randomise the source's phase [48] .
While the results above are promising, there is still a long way to go to be able to ensure the security of QKD implementations. In this paper we introduce, and experimentally demonstrate, a quantum hacking attack, which we call "laser seeding attack", that affects the intensity of the light emitted by the laser diode in the transmitter of a QKD system. In a sense, the attack is similar to the light injection attack recently introduced in Ref. 48 . However, Ref. 48 focused on the effect that Eve de-randomised the phase of the source, although modification of its intensity was also mentioned. Here, we show that the intensities of Alice's pulses are increased and controlled by Eve. Importantly, in the presence of this attack, current security analyses overestimate the resulting secret key rate and thus they do not guarantee security.
A laser seeding attack resembles a THA in the sense that, here, Eve also injects bright light into the QKD transmitter. However, now her goal is not to analyse the back-reflected light but to manipulate the functioning of the transmitter's laser diode [48] . Note that the injection of external photons of the proper wavelength into a laser diode can increase the number of photons that the diode emits through stimulated emission. That is, with her attack, Eve can increase the output optical power emitted by the laser diode on demand, without the legitimate users of the system noticing it. We have confirmed this fact experimentally for two types of laser diodes. Most importantly, we show below that this attack seriously compromises the security of decoy-state based QKD, which includes MDI-QKD with practical light sources as a prominent example. More precisely, we demonstrate that, in the presence of the attack, the resulting secret key rate estimated by Alice and Bob can be well above that provided by proper security proofs and, in some scenarios, it can be even above well-known upper bounds on the key rate. The latter means that there can be no security analysis that turns Alice and Bob's correlated data into a secure key or, to put it in other words, the secret key distilled by the QKD setup is totally insecure.
The paper is organized as follows. The experimental setup of the laser seeding attack and the basic hacking principle are introduced in Sec. II. The testing re- sults from two different types of laser diodes are given in Sec. III. These results illustrate the increase of the laser output energy in the presence of the attack. Section IV shows how this attack jeopardizes the security of QKD systems. Here we consider two specific protocols as example: the standard decoy-state BB84 protocol and MDI-QKD. We discuss possible countermeasures against the laser seeding attack and the possibility to combine various attacks against a QKD transmitter in Sec. V. Finally, we conclude in Sec. VI.
II. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
To investigate to which extent Eve can increase the output optical power of a laser diode by injecting light into it, we conduct an experiment whose schematic is illustrated in Fig. 1 . On Alice's side, the laser diode, as a testing target, generates optical pulses. As a hacker, Eve employs a tunable laser (Agilent 8164B) to send continuous-wave (c.w.) bright light to Alice's laser diode via a single-mode optical fibre. The tunable laser is able to adjust the wavelength and output power of the signals emitted so that Eve can inject photons with a proper wavelength into Alice's laser. In so doing, the energy of each injected photon can match the energy difference between the excited state and the ground state of the laser, and thus satisfy the condition for stimulated emission.
In order to maximize the injection efficiency, a polarization controller is used to adjust the polarization of Eve's laser such that it matches that of Alice's laser. To separate Eve's injected light from that emitted by Alice, we employ an optical circulator. Eve's light enters port 1 of the circulator and exits through its port 2, while Alice's light goes from port 2 of the circulator to its port 3 (see Fig. 1 ). We record Alice's output pulses with an optical-to-electrical converter with 40 GHz bandwidth (Picometrix PT-40A) that is connected to a highspeed oscilloscope (Agilent DSOX93304Q) of 33 GHz bandwidth. The average pulse energy is then calculated by integrating the recorded averaged waveform. A cross-check using an optical power meter has confirmed that this method is accurate. We observe the energy of Alice's laser pulses with and without Eve's tamper- ing laser. We have tested two ID300 short-pulse laser sources from ID Quantique and one LP1550-SAD2 laser diode (LD) from Thorlabs. They are triggered by an external signal. ID300 contains a factory pre-set pulsed driver electronics and produces 50-70 ps full width at half maximum (FWHM) optical pulses, with their repetition rate controlled by our external electronic pulse generator (PG; Picosecond 12050). LP1550-SAD2's diode current is driven directly from the PG with pulse parameters set to obtain about 60 ps FWHM optical pulses from the LD. The pulse repetition rate for all samples is 1 MHz. The electronic pulse generator also acts as the external trigger of the oscilloscope as shown in Fig. 1 .
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Both samples of ID300 exhibit controllability of their output power by Eve. We first measure the center wavelength of each laser with a spectrum analyser (Yokogawa AQ6370D). Then, in the experimental setup shown in Fig. 1 , we dial the value of Alice's wavelength in Eve's laser. As a result, the output power of Alice's pulse suddenly increases. To obtain the maximum output power under Eve's control, we finely tune Eve's wavelength until the largest energy rise is observed, which is 1550.15 nm for sample 1 and 1550.44 nm for sample 2. This is the case we focus on. Additionally, we have noted that slightly different seed wavelengths result in different pulse shapes as shown in Appendix A.
When we gradually increase the power of Eve's c.w. laser, the energy of Alice's emitted pulses also increases. This is shown in Fig. 2 (a) and (b) , which illustrates the waveforms of Alice's pulses for various tampering light powers. If we compare these results with the original waveform of Alice's pulses (i.e., that in the absence of Eve's tampering laser), there are two main effects. First, as already mentioned, we see that the energy of the emitted optical pulses gets larger when we increase the tampering light power. Especially, Eve's injected light makes Alice's laser pulses wider with a much longer and higher Average energy of Alice's output pulses as a function of Eve's tampering power for two samples of the laser ID300 from ID Quantique (black curves) and the laser diode LP1550-SAD2 from Thorlabs (red curve). The energy of the pulse increases up to 3.07 times for ID300 sample 1, 4.57 times for ID300 sample 2, and 1.13 times for Thorlabs LP1550-SAD2.
tail as shown in Fig. 2 (a) and (b). The tail contains more energy when higher power is injected into the diode. Second, under the laser seeding attack, the main peak of Alice's pulse shifts to be earlier. This is because the injected light triggers the stimulated emission that happens quicker than the spontaneous emission in Alice's laser diode. Thus, Alice's pulse reaches the peak power earlier and is followed by a tail with 2-4 secondary oscillations under the attack.
We have measured the energy of Alice's pulses for different tampering light powers. The results are shown in Fig. 3 as black curves. In particular, we find that when there is no attack, this energy is 0.232 pJ (0.169 pJ) for sample 1 (2) . Then, we gradually increase the power of Eve's c.w. laser up to 9 mW, and obtain that the output energy of Alice's laser rises up to 0.712 pJ (0.773 pJ) for sample 1 (2) . That is, the pulse energy increases 3.07 (4.57) times for sample 1 (2).
Under the same experimental procedure done with ID300, a similar effect is observed in the laser LP1550-SAD2. The wavelength of the injected c.w. light is set to the center wavelength of the laser diode first, then tuned slightly to 1551.32 nm where we observe the maximum increase in Alice's pulse energy. Figure 2 (c) shows the waveforms of Alice's pulses for the same tampering light powers as those in Fig. 2 (a) and (b). Similarly to ID300 lasers, here the energy of the pulses increases with the tampering power as well. The rising edge of Alice's pulse also starts earlier in the presence of the attack. The increase of the pulse energy as a function of Eve's tampering power is shown in Fig. 3 as a red curve. If there is no attack, the average energy of Alice's laser pulses is 0.196 pJ, while it reaches 0.221 pJ when the tampering power is 9 mW. That is, in this case the pulse energy increases 1.13 times.
IV. EFFECT ON THE SECURITY OF QKD
Now we show how an unnoticed increase of the optical power emitted by a QKD transmitter, due to the attack described in the previous sections, could seriously compromise the security of a QKD implementation. Here we assume that Alice's photon number statistics is Poissonian and is not influenced by our attack. The former may not necessarily be the case [49] , and investigating the validity of the latter assumption could be the topic of a future study.
We shall consider the case of decoy-state based QKD [35] [36] [37] , which includes the most implemented QKD schemes today. In decoy-state QKD, the transmitter emits quantum states that are diagonal in the Fock basis, and whose mean photon number is selected at random, within a predefined set of possible values, for each output signal. These states are typically generated with an attenuated laser diode emitting phaserandomized weak coherent pulses (WCPs) in combination with a variable attenuator to set the intensity of each individual light pulse. For concreteness, and to keep the discussion simple, we will consider first the case of the standard decoy-state BB84 protocol with phaserandomized WCPs; afterward, we will consider the case of MDI-QKD.
In particular, let Y α n (e α n ) denote the n-photon yield (error rate) in the polarization basis α ∈ {Z, X}. That is, Y α n (e α n ) represents the probability that an n-photon state prepared in the α basis generates a detection click (a detection click associated to an error in the α basis) at Bob's side. For each intensity setting µ, these quantities are related to the overall experimentally observed gain, G µ α , and to the overall experimentally observed error rate, E µ α , in the α basis as follows:
where p µ n denotes the probability that Alice emits an nphoton state when she selects the intensity setting µ. In the case of WCPs, these probabilities follow a Poissonian distribution, p µ n = e −µ µ n /n!, that only depends on the mean photon number µ. That is, G µ α (E µ α ) represents the probability that a WCP of intensity µ prepared in the α basis generates a detection click (a detection click associated to an error in the α basis) at Bob's side.
Importantly, Eq. (1) relates the observed quantities G 
In so doing, the bounds obtained for Y Z 1 and e X 1 by solving Eq. (2) are not guaranteed to be correct bounds for the single-photon yield in the Z basis nor for the phase error rate. Indeed, the correct bounds for these two quantities satisfy Eq. (1) after substituting µ with µ .
Next, we quantitatively evaluate the effect that a laser seeding attack has on the security of the standard decoystate BB84 protocol and of MDI-QKD for a typical channel model. For simplicity, in our analysis we shall assume the asymptotic scenario where Alice sends Bob an infinite number of pulses, i.e., we disregard statistical fluctuations due to finite size effects. Also, motivated by the experimental results presented in the previous section, we shall consider that Eve's attack increases all the intensities µ by the same factor κ > 1. That is, we will assume that µ = κµ for all µ.
A. Standard decoy-state BB84 protocol
We will evaluate the typical implementation where Alice and Bob use three different intensities, µ s , ν 1 and ν 2 that satisfy µ s > ν 1 > ν 2 , and they generate secret key only from those events where they employ the signal intensity µ s in the Z basis, while they use the X basis events for parameter estimation. In the asymptotic limit of an infinite number of transmitted signals, the secret key rate can be lower bounded by [50, 51] (3) where we assume the efficient version of this protocol [52] .
, the parameter f e is the error correction efficiency and 
with
and where the parameter Y X 1,L represents a lower bound on Y X 1 . This last quantity can be obtained by using Eq. (4) but now referred to the X basis.
In the presence of a laser seeding attack, Alice and Bob estimate Y Z 1,L and e X 1,U using Eqs. (4) and (5) but now with the experimentally observed quantities G µ α and E µ α , with α ∈ {Z, X}, µ = κµ and µ ∈ {µ s , ν 1 , ν 2 } for a certain κ that depends on the attack.
In our analysis we shall also evaluate an ultimate upper bound on the secret key rate based on the statistics collected by Alice and Bob during the quantum transmission phase of the protocol. That is, this upper bound holds for any possible post-processing method that Alice and Bob could apply to their raw data. The only assumption here is that double click events are randomly assigned to single click events. For this, we use the technique introduced in Ref. 53 . It is based on calculating the best separable approximation (BSA) [54] of a bipartite quantum state, σ n AB , shared by Alice and Bob in an entanglement based view of the protocol, which is equivalent to the actual protocol when Alice sends Bob an n-photon state. More precisely, the upper bound on the Total 12 key rate is given by
where r n ≈ e −µs µ n s /n! is the probability that Alice sends Bob an n-photon state with the signal intensity, λ For simulation purposes we use the experimental parameters listed in Table I . The resulting lower and upper bounds on the secret key rate are shown in Fig. 4 . The blue dotted line represents the lower bound R L given by Eq. (3) in the absence of the attack. Here, for each given value of the distance, we select the optimal values of the intensities µ s , ν 1 and ν 2 that maximize R L . These optimized intensities are then fixed, and we use them to simulate the degradation of the security bounds due to Eve's laser seeding attack. More precisely, the red solid line in Fig. 4 shows the value of R L that Alice and Bob would estimate in the presence of the attack when κ = 2. That is, here Alice and Bob, who are unaware of the attack, estimate the parameters Y , with α ∈ {Z, X}, µ = κµ and µ ∈ {µ s , ν 1 , ν 2 }, together with the modified intensities µ . As we can see in Fig. 4 , the secure R L given by the red dash-dotted line is significantly below the R L actually estimated by Alice and Bob. That is, in the presence of the attack, the security proof introduced in Refs. 50 and 51 cannot guarantee the security of the secret key obtained by Alice and Bob. Finally, the red dashed line illustrates the upper bound R U given by Eq. (7) in the presence of the attack. Remarkably, this upper bound is below the R L estimated by Alice and Bob for most of the distances, which demonstrates that the estimated secret key rate is actually insecure no matter what security proof is used. Table I .
Finally, in Fig. 5 we show the effect that the multiplicative factor κ has on the bounds on the secret key rate. For this, we now fix the transmission distance at a certain value, say 40 km. In this case, Fig. 5 shows that the incorrect lower bound R L that Alice and Bob would estimate is always above its correct value whenever κ > 1. This is remarkable because it means that in the presence of a laser seeding attack Alice and Bob always overestimate their secret key rate above that provided by the security proof. Moreover, if κ is large enough (around 1.7 for the experimental parameters used in Fig. 5 ), it turns out that the upper bound R U is below the estimated secret key rate, which confirms that there is no security proof which can make the estimated secret key rate secure.
We remark that in practice Eve might need to throttle the key rate to roughly the original level before the attack. Indeed a human operator of QKD equipment may suspect something abnormal is going on if the key generation rate rises well above the expected level (blue dotted line in Fig. 4) . To reduce the rate, Eve can introduce additional optical attenuation in the channel. figure) , RU is actually below the estimated secret key rate, which demonstrates that there is no security proof that can make the secret key obtained by Alice and Bob secure. In these simulations, the original intensity settings have been optimized previously for the distance of 40 km assuming no attack. The parameters used in the simulations are given in Table I .
B. MDI-QKD
Next we consider the case of MDI-QKD with WCPs [24] . Similar to the previous example, we shall assume that each of Alice and Bob use three different intensities, µ s , ν 1 and ν 2 that satisfy µ s > ν 1 > ν 2 , and they generate secret key from those events encoded with the signal intensity in the Z basis, while they use the X basis events for parameter estimation. In the asymptotic limit of an infinite number of transmitted signals (and assuming for simplicity a sifting factor ≈ 1), the secret key rate is lower bounded by [24] (8) where p µsµs 11 is the probability that both Alice and Bob emit a single-photon pulse in the Z basis when they both use the signal intensity setting µ s , Y Z 11,L is a lower bound on the yield associated to these single-photon events, e X 11,U is an upper bound on the phase error rate of these single-photon pulses, f e is again the error correction efficiency, G 
and
where Y X 11,L represents a lower bound on the yield associated to those single-photon events emitted by Alice and Bob in the X basis. This last quantity can be estimated using Eq. (9) but now referred to the X basis.
To evaluate R L in the presence of a laser seeding attack we follow a methodology similar to that used in the previous subsection, and we omit it here for simplicity.
Also, to evaluate an upper bound R U on the secret key rate, we extend the technique introduced in Ref. 53 to the case of MDI-QKD. Here, for simplicity, we consider that Alice and Bob only distill secret key from nonpositive partial transposed entangled states [56, 57] , i.e., we disregard the key material which could be obtained from positive partial transposed entangled states [58] . We refer the reader to Appendix C for further details about the upper bound R U .
For simulation purposes, we use again the experimental parameters given in Table I . For simplicity, we assume that Eve performs a symmetric attack in which she injects light of the same intensity into both Alice's and Bob's transmitter devices, which moreover we assume are identical. The resulting lower and upper bounds on the secret key rate are shown in Fig. 6 . For this example we consider three possible values for the multiplicative factor κ = {1, 1.5, 2.5}. The case κ = 1 corresponds to the scenario without attack. The results are analogous to those illustrated in Fig. 4 . In particular, the incorrect value of R L that Alice and Bob would estimate in the presence of the attack is well above the correct value of R L delivered by a proper application of the security proof (i.e., for the case where one considers the correct values of the output intensities modified by the attack). This is particularly critical for the case where κ = 2.5, as the security proof provides no secure key rate in this scenario while Alice and Bob would incorrectly estimate Table I .
a relatively high value for R L . Also, in this case, the upper bound R U is below the estimated R L for all distances (see Fig. 6 ).
V. DISCUSSION AND COUNTERMEASURE
It is clear that the effectiveness of the laser seeding attack described above crucially depends on the actual optical isolation of the users' transmitters. For a given power of Eve's injected light, the more isolation the users' transmitters have, the smaller the value of the multiplicative factor κ will be, and thus also the effectiveness of the attack. For example, according to Fig. 3 , if the power of Eve's injected light is say 10 W, then an isolation > 40 dB would result in a multiplicative factor κ < 2. Importantly, however, as we have seen in Fig. 5 , whenever k > 1 (which in principle might happen even for very high isolation), Alice and Bob might always overestimate their secret key rate, unless, of course, they modify their security analysis to properly incorporate the effect of the laser seeding attack.
For this, for instance, Alice and Bob could first bound the power of Eve's injected light to a reasonable value, as done for example in Refs. [45] [46] [47] . With this assumption in place, and for a given value of the isolation of their transmitters, as well as the behaviour of their laser sources, Alice and Bob could in principle upper bound the maximum value, κ max , that the parameter κ can take. In so doing, and for given observed experimental data (i.e., gains and error rates associated to different values of the intensity settings), they could simply minimize their secret key rate by taking into account that now the intensities of the emitted light pulses might lay in an interval [µ, κ max µ], where µ is the value of the original intensity setting. This way Alice and Bob consider the worst-case scenario and can guarantee that the resulting secret key rate is indeed secure.
In practice, however, it is important to note as well that Eve could in principle combine the laser seeding attack with other attacks, for example, with the laser damage attack [19, 59] , with the THA analysed in Refs. 42, 45-47, 60, and 61, and/or with recently introduced injection-locking attack [62] . For instance, besides using her injected light to modify the internal functioning of the transmitter (as done in the laser seeding attack), Eve could also simultaneously perform a THA and measure the back-reflected light to obtain information about the transmitter's settings for each emitted light pulse. This means that to properly evaluate the security of a QKD system, one should probably combine the techniques described in the previous paragraph with the security analysis introduced in Refs. 42, 45-47. Eve could also employ the fact that the laser seeding can be affected in real time by the state of Alice's modulator, changing the laser wavelength depending on the modulator setting [62] and/or modulating the intensity multiplication factor κ. In addition, it might be possible that Eve is able to decrease the value of the transmitter's isolation by using the laser damage attack. In this scenario, she could inject more light into the laser diode, thus increasing the value of κ max and the performance of the other attacks just mentioned.
VI. CONCLUSION
This study has experimentally demonstrated that the laser seeding attack is able to increase the intensity of the light emitted by the laser diode used in a QKD system. Moreover, we have shown theoretically that such increase of the intensity might seriously compromise the security of QKD implementations. For this, we have considered two prominent examples: the standard decoy-state BB84 protocol and MDI-QKD, both implemented with phaserandomized weak coherent pulses. In both cases, we have demonstrated that, in the presence of the attack, the legitimate users of the system might significantly overestimate the secret key rate provided by proper security proofs, even well above known upper bounds.
While MDI-QKD is immune to all detector sidechannel attacks, our work highlights that further research is needed to protect the system against source side-channel attacks.
While preparing this Article for publication, we have learned of another laser seeding experiment that changes the wavelength of Alice's laser rather than its intensity [62] .
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We thank Koji Azuma for very useful discussions. In the laser seeding attack discussed in Sec. III, we pick the wavelength of the injected light to obtain the maximum energy of Alice's optical pulses. At this wavelength, we observe the increased energy and the longer tail, as shown in Fig. 2 . Moreover, we have tested the injected light with slightly different wavelengths that are still in the wavelength range of the laser diode from the high-speed oscilloscope, see Fig. 7 . Sample 1 of ID300 with 1 nm linewidth is shown as an example. When 2 mW power is injected into the laser, different wavelengths result in different waveforms. At 1550.15 nm, Alice's pulse has the highest energy but relatively lower peak power. When the wavelength is slightly off the center wavelength, at 1549.98 nm, the peak power becomes higher, however the tail is lower. This trend continues when the wavelength is shifted further to 1549.76 nm. Here we briefly summarize the technique introduced in Ref. 53 to derive an upper bound on the secret key rate for a decoy-state QKD protocol. It basically consists in finding the best separable approximation (BSA) [54] among all bipartite quantum states that are compatible with the measurement results observed by Alice and Bob in an execution of the protocol. That is, these are the states that Alice and Bob could have shared in a virtual entanglement protocol that is equivalent to the actual protocol. For simplicity, Ref. 53 considers a decoy-state protocol where Alice and Bob use an infinite number of decoy settings. Note, however, that in the asymptotic limit where Alice sends Bob an infinite number of signals, an upper bound on the secret key rate for this protocol applies as well to a protocol using a finite number of decoy settings. We follow the same procedure here.
In particular, let S n denote the set of all bipartite quantum states, σ n AB , which are compatible with Alice and Bob's measurement results in a virtual entanglement protocol that is equivalent to the actual protocol when Alice sends Bob an n-photon signal. That is, this set is defined as
where {A k } k and {B j } j are the measurement operators of Alice and Bob in the virtual entanglement protocol, and p n kj represent the measured statistics associated to the n-photon signals emitted by Alice. Since we assume that Alice uses an infinite number of decoy intensities, we consider that she can estimate these probabilities precisely.
The states σ n AB ∈ S n can always be expressed as a convex sum of one separable state, σ n sep , and one entangled state, ρ n ent , as follows
for some real parameter λ n ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the BSA of the states in S n corresponds to that state with the maximum value of the parameter λ n , which we shall denote by λ n BSA . That is, for every n, we want to find the parameter λ
as well as the corresponding entangled state ρ n ent for the BSA.
In standard decoy-state QKD with four sending states, Alice's measurement operators {A k } k can be described by a projective measurement in a four-dimensional Hilbert space, i.e., A k = |k k| with k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Each operator A k is associated with Alice sending one of the four possible polarization states of the BB84 protocol. On Bob's side, his measurement operators {B j } j correspond to a positive-operator valued measurement (POVM) with the following elements
where
(|0 ± |1 ), and |vac is the vacuum state. As already mentioned in the main text, here we implicitly assume that double click events are randomly assigned by Bob to single click events.
In addition, we have that in a prepare&measure QKD scheme the reduced density matrix of Alice, ρ n A = Tr B (σ n AB ), is fixed by her state preparation process. In the scenario considered, it turns out that ρ n A can be written as [53] 
Putting all the conditions together, one can obtain the parameter λ n BSA and the corresponding entangled state ρ n ent , for each n, by solving the following semidefinite program (SDP) [53] 
where the vector x is used to parametrize the density operators and Γ denotes partial transposition of one of the subsystems. 
The upper bound on the secret key rate can then be written as [53, 63] 
where r n ≈ e −µ µ n /n! is the probability that Alice sends Bob an n-photon state, where µ is the mean photon number of the signal, and I Here we extend the results in Ref. 53 to the MDI-QKD framework to calculate an upper bound on the secure key rate coming, for simplicity, from nonpositive partial transposed entangled states [56, 57] . Like in Ref. 53 , we consider for simplicity that Alice and Bob use an infinite number of decoy settings (see also Appendix B).
In MDI-QKD, both Alice and Bob are transmitters while, in the middle, an untrusted third party Charles is supposed to perform a Bell state measurement on the incoming signals and publicity announce the result. Let c ∈ S an denote Charles' announcement, where S an is the set of all possible announcements. This set includes the possible Bell states that Charles can obtain with his measurement as well as the inconclusive event.
For each announcement c, we will denote the set of bipartite quantum states, σ nm AB,c , that Alice and Bob could have shared in an equivalent virtual entanglement protocol (given that in the actual protocol they sent n and m photons to Charles, respectively) as S 
for some real parameter λ 
where p c|nm is the conditional probability that Charles announces c given that Alice (Bob) sends him an nphoton (m-photon) state, r nm ≈ e −2µ µ n+m /(n!m!) is the probability that Alice and Bob send Charles an n-photon state and an m-photon state, respectively, where µ is the mean photon number of their WCPs, and I note that Alice's (Bob's) measurement operators {A k } k ({B j } j ) can be described by a projective measurement in a four-dimensional Hilbert space, i.e., A k = |k k| (B j = |j j|) with k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}). Each operator A k (B j ) is associated with Alice (Bob) sending one of the four possible polarization states of the BB84 protocol to Charles.
In addition, and similar to the case of Appendix B, we have that both the reduced density matrices of Alice and Bob are fixed by their state preparation processes. More precisely, ρ 
